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AN UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT TO USE
SOCIOLOGICAL EVIDENCE1
LYNN MCDONALD*
In December of 1968 Thomas Murphy, a sociology student at the
University of New Brunswick, wrote a column in the student newspaper criti-
cizing a judge, certain proceedings and the court system in general. He was
charged with scandalizing the court or bringing it into public ridicule and
contempt. In March, 1969 the Appeal Division of the Supreme Court of New
Brunswick (where the proceedings were initiated) found Murphy guilty and
sentenced him to ten days in jail.2
The case raises a number of important issues both from the legal and the
sociological perspectives (themselves in sharp conflict in places we shall see).
The essential points of the case will first be briefly described. Sociological
evidence on the effect of the cited column on people's opinions of the courts,
which the court refused to admit, will next be outlined. The reasons for the
Court's refusal to admit this evidence, the opinion rule and the hearsay rule,
will be critically analyzed. Social science findings on the effect of newspapers
on people's attitudes, evidence also ruled inadmissible, will be described. Then
the reasons for the Court's refusal to admit it will be discussed. This will be
followed by a broader treatment of the nature of evidence, theories, probability
statements, speculation and calculation. Finally the necessity for the offence
of contempt of court by scandalizing will be discussed. Throughout this paper
we will attempt to relate legal theory to the best social science theory and
research findings available.
The Murphy Case
Murphy wrote the offending article for his regular signed column, "Spades
Down", in haste and outrage after giving evidence during the trial of a univer-
sity professor on another contempt of court. Very briefly Dr. Norman Strax,
a University of New Brunswick physics professor, was being tried for breaking
an injunction forbidding him to enter the university grounds. (He had earlier
been suspended from teaching there.) One of the professor's lawyers was
ordered out of court during the hearing, this being the initial reason for
Murphy's criticism of the Court. The professor was convicted and ordered to
pay $2,000 in exemplary damages to the university and costs.
* Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, McMaster University.
I While assuming the usual responsibility for all faults in this paper I would like to
thank Mr. Alan Borovoy, defence counsel, Professor John Hogarth, Osgoode Hall Law
School, and Professor Stanley Schiff, University of Toronto Law School, for their advice
and criticism.
2 R. v. Murphy (1969), 4 D.L.R. 3d 289.
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The original cause of Strax's suspension strains the imagination. The
professor refused to use an identification card for taking books out of the
university library, a procedure that had only just been instituted at the
university. He with about six students took a large number of books (several
hundred) to the check out counter and, since the clerk would not sign out the
books to him without the card, piled the books on the check-out counter.
The chief librarian responded by closing the library. The same procedure was
followed the next two days and on the third Professor Strax was suspended.
This was followed by a 48 day sit-in in his office, which is something of a
North American record. The sit-in idea came from Murphy, although this is
not relevant to the contempt proceedings. One of the results of the sit-in was
that a number of students went to jail, this being the first time in Canada police
were called in to end a student protest. Another professor also refused to use
the identification card in the library, similarly stacking up books, but no action
was taken against him. The Canadian Association of University Teachers
subsequently censured the university for its suspension of Strax without due
process, and for its seeking the court injunction. The gravity of censure is
indicated by the fact that the association had used the censure sanction only
once before in its entire history.
It should here be noted that Professor Strax, an American citizen, is a
political radical and has been active in a new group called the Canadian
Struggle for a Democratic Society. Murphy was also active in that group,
as well as being at the time the national president elect of the Student Christian
Movement.
Murphy's column was published soon after his presence at the court
hearing. In it he specifically criticized the court's dismissal of the defence
lawyer, offering reasons as to why he thought the court was wrong. He then
went from that particular instance to the judicial system as a system, stating
what he thought was wrong with it and why. Briefly this was to the effect that
it did not serve justice but was the tool of the corporate elite.
Three weeks later Murphy and the student editor of the paper were
charged with contempt of court. (The publisher was not charged.) The editor
purged his contempt in the prescribed way and was fined $50. Murphy decided
to fight the charge and this paper is concerned with his defence.
A distinguished lawyer in his eighties, Mr. J. F. H. Teed, was brought out
of retirement to handle the case for the prosecution. 3 This made the gen-
eration gap, apparent throughout the proceedings, even more visible. Murphy
had difficulty getting counsel. Eventually the Canadian Civil Liberties Associa-
tion took the case, with its general counsel, Mr. Alan Borovoy, acting.
The trial raised a number of issues, of which only those involving socio-
logical analysis, will be discussed here.4 There are three such propositions,
and none of these favourably impressed the Court.
3 The implications of this procedure are discussed by Cameron in an article in
Canadian Forum (1969).
4 The legal issues may be discussed in a later article by Borovoy.
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1. That the cited column did not actually have the effect of lowering its
readers' opinions of the court.
2. That newspapers generally and controversial statements in them more
particularly do not by themselves change opinions, but rather more often
reinforce existing ones. University students have already formed their
fundamental political orientations, which include their views on the legiti-
macy of the courts, and so are not readily susceptible to attitude change
via the mass media.
3. That since it is legal for people at a university to teach and write about
theories on the power elite's role in society, it must be legal for a student
to discuss them, even in an erroneous way. The right of free speech
includes the right to criticize the courts, even erroneously.
The effect of the column on public opinion
The defence had a survey conducted by a sociologist (the writer) to
determine the effect of the article on the opinions of the courts held by the
readers. The hypothesis was that if the article had the effect of bringing the
courts into public ridicule then people who read the article would have had
less favourable opinions of the courts than people who did not read the article.
This assumes that readers and non-readers started out with similar views
of courts. Certainly there was no reason for considering that non-readers
would have started out with less favourable views of the courts than readers.
If there were any differences in opinions before the article was written it would
be more likely that they would be in the opposite direction. That is, a column
of dissent would be more likely to be read by people with negative views of the
courts, or at least a propensity to dissent. Thus readers of the column might
have started off with slightly more negative views than non-readers. In any
event any difference found between readers and non-readers of the column
was to be attributed to the reading of the column.
As most of the student population of the university had read the column
(not so much immediately as after its attaining notoriety) it was necessary to
draw from another university for a non-reader comparison group. Mount
Allison University in Sackville, New Brunswick, being the closest English-
speaking university to U.N.B., was the obvious choice. St. Thomas University,
a Catholic institution on the same grounds as the University of New Bruns-
wick, was considered part of U.N.B. for purposes of the survey since its
students read the same student paper.
Random samples of the student populations of the University of New
Brunswick, St. Thomas and Mount Allison were drawn from the appropriate
student directories, in accordance with standard sampling methods. Interviews
were conducted at the place of residence of the students. The interviewers,
mostly university professors and faculty wives, were instructed in interviewing
by the writer. None of the interviewers were students. The questionnaire was
pre-tested in several stages with students at McMaster University.
An exceptionally high yield of the sample was attained. There were only
two refusals and less than five per cent were unavailable whenever contacted.
1970]
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Substitutions were allowed when the student whose name was drawn had
moved away and was replaced by another student.
It is proper when random sampling techniques are used to infer from the
sample to the population. Thus it is proper to consider the survey results as
constituting the opinions of the whole student body even though only 171
University of New Brunswick students were interviewed and 136 Mount
Allison. In fact, the samples actually obtained were highly representative of
the student populations they were supposed to represent, as can be seen in
Appendix A.
The ten minute interview contained eight questions about the courts, inter-
spersed with 38 others intended to disguise the purpose of the questionnaire.
It started off with questions on the problems of Indians and Negroes and the
Bill of Rights. The question on whether or not the student had read the
column resulting in the court case came after a number of questions on Cana-
dian and American reading material - what specific publications, and what
type of writing (editorial, news, column etc.) he read.
The disguise was necessary as there was considerable unfavourable
feeling about the accused at the time. During the week of interviewing a
petition was circulated on the University of New Brunswick campus to over-
rule a Student Council decision to award Murphy funds from the student
treasury for his legal expenses. Over 20 per cent of the students signed it.
The eight questions on the courts cover the major areas in which people
expect the courts to act fairly:
-how frequently do they make serious mistakes?
-do they discriminate on grounds of race, social class or political
persuasion?
-can a person expect to get fair treatment from the courts?
The actual wording of the questions can be seen in Table 1, with the results
of the tabulations and the statistical tests applied to them.
(Table I - see pages 596, 597)
The proportions of the readers and non-readers giving a favourable
answer were compared on each question. The differences between the two
groups turned out to be only trivial, in two cases of only 0.1 per cent. The
largest difference was of 7.3 per cent, in this case more of the readers having
the favourable view of the courts than the non-readers. In no case were the
differences between the readers and non-readers greater than would easily
occur by ordinary sampling fluctuation.
There were eight possible opportunities for the hypothesis that the readers
and the non-readers had similar favourable opinions of the courts to be
rejected. Yet in not one case was there the slightest indication of a difference.
It is extremely unlikely that cheating could have had any effect on the
results, an important point to consider when we discuss the hearsay problem
later. It would not even have been possible for a student or interviewer trying
to help the accused to cheat. A student in the sample (for example who had
read the column) to help the accused would have had to have known the exact
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proportions giving favourable and unfavourable responses to each of the court
questions, for the reader and the non-reader groups separately. He would then
have had to have given a response favourable to the courts if the reader group
had a lower proportion favourable, or an unfavourable response if the reader
group were already higher on the favourable. Of course the information as to
how the others had responded would not have been available until too late,
after the results had been tabulated.
A student interviewee opposed to the accused could cheat by giving
unfavourable responses on all questions if he claimed he had read the column,
and favourable if he had claimed not to have. This fissumes that he knew the
purpose and the method of analysis of the study, which was highly unlikely.
The only person in a position to cheat, by altering the tabulations after
the interviewing, was the writer. The availability of the actual interview forms
for inspection makes that highly unlikely.
The opinion rule
The Court ruled the evidence inadmissible on two grounds, violation of
the opinion rule and the hearsay rule. We will first discuss the opinion rule
which, although not mentioned in the judgment, was the reason given by the
Court at the time it ruled the evidence inadmissible. The Court stated that
even if the interviewees had been in court to give their evidence it would not
have been admissible because they were students and not experts, and there-
fore incompetent to give evidence on opinions. Thus while the offence of con-
tempt lies in having changed people's opinions about courts, evidence
regarding opinions is not admissible.
It is contended that the application of the opinion rule is mistaken for a
number of reasons. Many exceptions to the rule are already recognized.
Ordinary witnesses regularly give their opinions on the speed of a car, tem-
perature, weather, identity of an object, reputation, similarity of one trademark
to another, and the value of commonplace articles. Court procedure would be
considerably hampered if this evidence could not be given by ordinary
witnesses.
More generally opinion evidence is admissible from non-experts when it
is too complicated to be separated from the facts on which it was based, or
when the passage of time has made the distinction impossible. Clearly on a
matter such as the quality of justice dispensed by courts no individual could
realistically make any fact-opinion distinction. To imagine this possible one
would have to suppose that parents and teachers spend a number of years
teaching children facts about the court system, without betraying their own
opinions, and then that the children later drew their own inferences from
the facts.
The reasons for the exclusion of opinion evidence clearly show how
inapplicable the rule is to the present case. One main reason is that some
opinion evidence from an ordinary witness would not assist the court, or might
even mislead it, when on the same matter an expert's more informed opinion
would be useful. In this case of course no expert opinion could have been
more relevant than the opinions of the student readers themselves. Secondly
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the opinion might usurp the function of the jury by speaking directly to the
issue it is to decide. Yet even in this situation such evidence is allowed in
some cases.5 The effect of the newspaper column on the students' opinion
which the survey would have shown, is not the ultimate issue the Court has to
decide. The question of how much attitude change in how many people
constitutes "public contempt" would still have to be decided.
In any event the whole distinction between fact and opinion developed
in American rules of evidence is, according to Wigmore, "merely the logically
technical development of a misunderstood term". This occurred when the
prohibition of evidence by ordinary witnesses on "mere opinion", that is
opinion not based on facts, was extended to include all opinion.
The distinction between fact and opinion in terms of reliability of report-
ing is only one of degree. Opinion and observation are all stored in the same
brain and subjected to the same psychological and cultural biases. Subjects in
psychological experiments see long lines when they should see short, read
"steak" for "seak" and misperceive all kinds of sensory stimuli. Moreover it is
possible to find out how reliably measurable opinions are. Thus it would be
possible to find out and use opinions in evidence that are as reliably held as
physical observations.
The hearsay rule
The other reason given for the inadmissibility of the survey evidence was
that it was hearsay. The judgement states only that the defence had a
sociologist in Fredericton for a few days who had some interviews conducted
with some students, and that this evidence was clearly inadmissible. Obviously
the sociologist's report of the interviewers' reports of the interviewees' words
would have been hearsay, but this is not what was offered to the Court. The
fact that the interviewers were present in court to swear to what they had been
told, and the fact that the interview records were also in court was not men-
tioned, omissions which give a highly misleading picture of the evidence to
have been introduced.
The defence's understanding of hearsay was quite different from the
Court's and is given below. American courts which operate with the same
rules on hearsay clearly have accepted these reasons at least since 1919 when
the first opinion poll evidence was admitted.6 The Murphy case appears to be
the first attempt to use survey evidence in a Canadian court.
The survey evidence consisted of opinions on the courts and the fact of
whether or not the interviewee read the column in question. Evidence that
certain opinions exist is not hearsay at all. And evidence from the students
5 Rupert Cross. Evidence. London: Butterworths, 1963, 2nd edition.
6 The use of survey evidence in American courts and the conditions for introducing
it are extensively discussed in an article by Sorenson and Sorenson, hence it will not be
treated here. "Opinion research evidence." New York University Law Review. V. 28,
1953, pp. 1213-61. The most frequent examples are civil suits on trademarks of products,
and, in criminal matters, to obtain a change of venue on grounds of prejudice in the
community.
7 Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd ed., 1420.
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on whether or not they had read the column can be admitted as an exception
to the hearsay rule, which point we will come back to. That certain opinions
of the courts existed is all the defence had to introduce into court. The
defence did not have to bring evidence as to the truth of the opinions given
to the interviewers, which it could not have done without calling the student
interviewees.
The point is that truth is of dubious relevance to opinions on the subject
in question, the quality of justice in New Brunswick courts. For example, the
statement that the courts of New Brunswick dispense justice as fairly as other
Canadian courts is either true or false. But since this has never been objec-
tively studied, nobody knows whether the statement is true or false. However,
even if the answer were known, that would not matter. What is relevant to
the contempt charge is what people think about the justice dispensed by New
Brunswick courts. It may be true that New Brunswick courts are not as fair
as other courts but that people think they are. Any readers who lowered their
opinion on the courts as a result of reading a newspaper article would then
come closer to the truth, but the article would have brought the courts into
contempt.
The one area of frequent dishonesty in surveys known about is that
respondents have a tendency to slant answers in the direction they think will
please the interviewer. Thus more people say they voted than could have
because people consider voting a citizen's duty and do not like to announce to
a fellow citizen that they have not done theirs. That kind of bias would not
be harmful in the present survey as it would affect the reader and the non-
reader groups alike.
The interview method relies on confidentiality and rapport to gain its
version of truthful answers. The courts rely on the method of sworn evidence,
cross-examination and the threat of punishment for perjury to gain theirs.
They are different styles. There is research evidence to show that surveys do
obtain valid and reliable results on the whole. The same cannot be said for
sworn evidence, which is merely asserted to be valid. The collection of infor-
mation is of course the only function the survey has to fulfill. It does not have
any ritual to perform to remind citizens of the importance of obeying the law,
or of the dire punishments the Courts can hand out to those who do not. The
Court does this, as well as deciding on the facts of a case and the guilt of the
accused. The problem arises in that the task of reinforcing respect for the
established institutions may interfere with the task of acquiring and inter-
preting information.
Yet even if the court method is good for obtaining truthful information
in some or even most respects it is not the best way for all kinds of informa-
tion. And for finding out the state of public opinion it is clearly an imprac-
tical and inappropriate method.
It cannot handle the numbers required for an accurate picture of public
opinion. In this case a parade of 207 witnesses would have been necessary to
obtain the same information as the survey. The large number of individual
statements would have caused much confusion and made it difficult to assess
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the overall result. More importantly the witnesses obtained for any such case
would not constitute a random sample of the appropriate public and so it
would have been wrong to make any assertions about the public they were
supposed to represent. Obviously people willing to spend a day in court to
give evidence for the defence would be partial to that side and vice versa.
Of course it would be possible to draw a random sample of names and
subpoena witnesses irrespective of their willingness to attend, but this would
violate an essential condition of surveying - that the circumstances under
which the information is obtained be the same for all respondents. Witnesses
not interested in the case would probably begrudge the time in court and react
differently from those who were concerned. Early witnesses would not know
how the evidence was to be used but later ones could probably figure this out.
The possibility of cheating, extremely remote with the interview method, would
be very high with the court.
Evidence gathered with the survey method would be admissible if the
principles to the exceptions to the hearsay rule were applied. These principles,
albeit not entirely accepted, are based on the purpose of the hearsay rule itself
- to avoid untrustworthy, untested assertions in evidence. Wigmore states
two principles to be considered: the circumstantial probability of trustworthi-
ness in the evidence, and the necessity for it.
The survey evidence clearly gets full marks for necessity. There was no
other evidence on the effect of the impugned article on its readers; in fact the
case was eventually decided without there being any evidence of any kind.
On the circumstantial probability of trustworthiness the survey method
deserves high, but not perfect marks. Wigmore outlines several tests for ascer-
taining the truth, equivalent to that of cross-examination.
(a) "Where the circumstances are such that a sincere and accurate state-
ment would naturally be uttered, and no plan of falsification be formed."8
Since the interviewees were not made aware of the plan of the survey they
were not in a position to form any plan of falsification.
(b) "Where, even though a desire to falsify might present itself, other con-
siderations such as the danger of easy detection or the fear of punish-
ment, would probably counteract its force"; 9
The writer might have had a desire to falsify the results, but was subject
to easy detection as the records were made available to the Court, and was
subject to punishment for perjury upon giving false evidence as to the results.
(c) "Where the statement was made under such conditions of publicity that
an error, if it had occurred, would probably have been detected and
corrected". 10
This applies as well, for the reasons given immediately above.
8 Wigmore, op. cit., 1422.
9 Wigmore, op. cit., 1422.
10 Wigmore, op. cit., 1422.
[VOL. 8, NO. 3
Supreme Court Review
The general effect of newspapers on public opinion
The view that newspaper articles do not change people's minds (on
matters which they already have formed opinions) is enormously unpopular.
However it is well supported with empirical evidence and there is no serious
academic opinion against it.
The consensus of findings on the subject is that communications intended
to be persuasive typically reinforce people's current views far more than
change them." By themselves the mass media, including the newspapers, are
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of change of public opinion.
People are exposed more to, and take more notice of, information consistent
with the views they already hold than to contrary information.'2 People tend
to discredit information that challenges their existing beliefs rather than change
their beliefs.'3
Newspapers have been found to be even less persuasive than the other
mass media forms. People consider news reporting on television more truth-
ful than in the newspapers. Material given in written form is understood and
remembered less well than that given in a speech or on television. Even lengthy
and consistent editorializing has been found to be ineffective in changing
people's votes in American presidential elections.14
Communications by a person disapproved of may have the reverse effect.
For example a Communist speaker advocating a certain measure to a non-
Communist audience had more people disapprove of the measure after the
speech than before it.' 5
The point is that the communication by itself does not change attitudes.
The conjunction of certain material information about both sides of the issue
rather than propaganda on one, from a highly respected source, 16 presented to
people susceptible to attitude change by changed personal circumstances, the
attitudes of associates and the direction of thinking they had been following
recently can. Also the more kinds of media the message is communicated
through the more likely the attitude change.'7 Thus rather than assuming that
a single newspaper column has any effect in the direction intended it is neces-
sary to consider all these surrounding facts. For example, a young American
about to be drafted, whose brother had just been imprisoned for desertion,
whose best friend had been killed in Vietnam, whose other close friends had
"1 Joseph T. Klapper, The Effects of Mass Communication. Glencoe: Free Press,
12 Bernard R. Berelson, et al., Voting. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954.
1960.
13 Leon Festinger. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Evanston, Illinois: Row,
Peterson, 1957.14 Maxwell McCombs. "Editorial endorsements" Journalism Quarterly. V. 44 1967,
p. 545.
15 L. Sargent and Webb. "The radical speaker on the university campus." Journal of
Communication. V. 16, 1966, p. 199.
16 Carl I. Hovland, et al., Communication and Persuasion. New Haven: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1953.
17 Melvin M. Tumin. "Exposure to mass media and readiness for desegregation."
Public Opinion Quarterly. V. 21, 1957, p. 237-51.
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just joined an anti-war group, who had started to be sympathetic with anti-war
sentiments and read anti-war publications, would be fairly likely to show
attitude change (against the war) after a speech by Dr. Spock at a
demonstration.
In the Murphy case consideration of the conduciveness factors shows that
the column was highly unlikely to have affected opinions. The article con-
tained little information and was highly propagandistic; it was clearly one-
sided. The source, a young student with radical political views, would not be
a credible source for the bulk of readers.
The admissibility of expert evidence
The defence had an expert witness, Dr. Frank E. Jones, Professor of
Sociology at McMaster University, qualified to give evidence on the above
points among others. His evidence was also ruled inadmissible. In making
that ruling the Court cited Phipson on Evidence which had been quoted in a
Supreme Court of Canada decision:
"Neither experts nor ordinary witnesses may give their opinions upon matters
of legal or moral obligation, or general human nature, or the manner in which
other persons would probably act or be influenced".8
The rest of the passage, not quoted in the Supreme Court judgement,
gives several examples of inadmissible evidence from the cited cases, and
explains why such evidence is not admissible:
"So the opinions of cattle drovers and the like are not admissible upon the question
of how an accident to cattle in a railway truck must have happened.., nor to the
prudence of an agistor putting horses to graze amongst homed cattle ... nor are
those of firemen as to whether there was anything to point to the fire having
occurred accidentally, (for this is not a matter of scientific knowledge.)19
Phipson appears to have been an unfortunate choice for a statement of
the law on evidence on this point. The rule given, presumably derived from
the cases cited, is not supported by those same cases. The evidence on the
prudence of the agister in letting his horse graze among horned cattle was
admitted without apparent objection. Evidence on how a fire must have
started was also admitted, in one case out of the two cited. Confusion on this
point can perhaps be minimized by tracing the origin of Phipson's general rule
and fitting in the other cases chronologically. Then we shall ascertain how
applicable the rule is to the present case.
The proscription on "legal or moral obligation" and on "how others
would probably act or be influenced" appears to be a quotation from the
judgement in Campbell v. Rickards,20 one of the cases Phipson cites in the
section. In this case evidence had been admitted in the trial court on what the
insurers of a ship's cargo would have done if they had received different
information from what they did in fact receive. Chief Justice Denman in
delivering the judgement of the court on the appeal stated: "Witnesses con-
versant in a particular trade may be allowed to speak to a prevailing practice
18 Phipson. 8th edition, p. 385, cited in Adam v. Campbell, [1950] 3 D.L.R., 449.
19 Phipson. 8th edition, loc. cit.
20 [1833], B & A, 840.
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in that trade; scientific persons may give their opinion on matters of science;
but witnesses are not receivable to state their views on matters of legal or
moral obligation, nor on the manner in which others would probably be
influenced, if the parties had acted in one way rather than another."2'
The reasons for this are also stated:
"It is not a question of science, in which scientific men will mostly think alike,
but a question of opinion, liable to be governed by fancy, and in which the
diversity might be endless." 22
Clearly the evidence ruled inadmissible in this case is not remotely similar
to the evidence to have been introduced in the contempt case. The sociological
evidence included nothing on legal or moral obligation, and the evidence on
the interpretation of the survey, the mass media, and the impressionability of
university students were all matters of science on which there has been con-
siderable research. Sufficient work has been done for there to be a consensus
among social scientists on these points; they are no longer matters of opinion
"governed by fancy" and characterized by "endless diversity".
The point forbidding evidence on "general human nature" appears to
have come from the well known case of Bourne v. Swan and Edgar23 which
Phipson also cites. The court ruled inadmissible evidence that people would
be deceived by the swan decorations used by Swan and Edgar, thinking they
were the same swans on which Bourne had the trademark. The judgement
states:
"It appears to me that there is another reason against the admissibility, and
that is that I do not see how you can call any individual to give what is in truth
expert evidence as to human nature, because what they are asked in this form
of question is, not what would happen to them individually, but what they
think the rest of the world would be likely to suppose or believe. They are not
experts in human nature, nor can they be called to give such evidence, and,
apart from admissibility, one cannot help feeling that there is a certain prone-
ness in the human mind to think that other people are perhaps more foolish
than they really are."
However in another case24 Phipson cites evidence admitted by wit-
nesses who said they actually had been deceived into thinking a firm displaying
the royal arms had a warrant to do so. So evidence about how other people
would probably act is not admissible but evidence about how a person himself
feels is.
Despite the belief expressed in Bourne v. Swan and Edgar that people
would not give evidence that they themselves had been deceived, people did
give just that evidence in the later case. Indeed on practically any passing off
action both plaintiff and defendant could get a parade of witnesses to give
opinions supporting their side. But this evidence would be of very low quality.
21 Id., p. 846.
22 Id., p. 847.
23 [1903] I Ch. L. R., p. 211-231.
24 Royal Warrant Holders' Association v. Deane and Beal Limited, 1912, I Ch.,
p. 10-23.
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Unless the witnesses are drawn randomly from the appropriate population they
cannot properly be thought to represent it. And it is the scope of the deception
in the population that is iinportant, not the effect on the short parade of
witnesses.
However all the arguments about people being or not being deceived,
whether based on evidence from people themselves or from how other people
think they would act, is now superfluous. It is possible to conduct opinion
polls of representative cross-sections of the relevant populations to find out
whether people were or were not actually deceived on any particular trade-
mark. This is what is frequently done in American cases. (And this is what
was done in the contempt case.) Thus the question is no longer a matter of
speculating about "general human nature" but of making inferences from
empirical evidence on very specific hypotheses.
The distinction between evidence of speculation and evidence of a scien-
tific nature can further be seen in the two arson cases cited. In one 5 the
prosecution had a superintendent of the fire brigade give evidence of certain
experiments made with candles of different lengths, like those of the candle
ends found in the debris of the fire. The object was to support the prose-
cution's theory that the fire had been deliberately set. The defence objected
to the admission of the evidence but it was admitted.
In the other case, however, the evidence of the fireman was not
admitted.26 That evidence had not been based on experiments as had the
earlier one. According to the judgement how the fire started "was not a
question of scientific knowledge but the mere opinion of the witness. 2 7
Similarly, in two other cases Phipson cites on inadmissibility, no scientific
evidence was involved. In Hatch v. Lewis28 the evidence of jurors as to what
decision they would have reached if the evidence had been different was ruled
inadmissible. In Smith v. Midland Railway29 the plaintiff, a cattle drover and
farmer, gave "so-called evidence"30 about how an accident must have
happened to his cows while they were being transported by the Midland Rail-
way Company. The cattle drover had not been present in the railway car at
the time, and, needless to say, had not conducted any scientific experiments
subsequently on other cows on the same or any other railway. The objection
to the evidence was clearly stated in the judgement, that the plaintiff was just
"not an expert competent to give evidence" on the subject.31
The citation of Smith v. Cook on the point appears to have been a
mistake, and if not its relevance is highly doubtful. Both the plaintiff and the
defendant brought evidence on the wisdom of grazing a young horse on
unfenced marshland near a horned bull. No objection to the evidence was
25 R. v. Heseltine. [1873] Criminal Law Cases, (N. Cir.) 404-407.
26R. v. Cattermoul. [1894] Central Criminal Court, (Sessional Papers) 151.
27 Id., p. 157.
28 [1861] 2, Foster and Finlayson's Reports, 467.
29 [1888] 57 L.T. 813.
SO Id., p. 8 13.
31id.
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raised by either party or by the court. The case clearly does not involve
scientific knowledge and would appear to be irrelevant as well in that it con-
cerns the disposition of horned cattle rather than general human nature.
Even the Supreme Court of Canada case,32 although less pastoral than
the preceding, involves conditions quite different from the present one. The
defence had evidence introduced, to which the Court did not object, on the
"reaction time" of drivers facing normal traffic hazards. This was based on
experiments conducted personally by one of the expert witnesses, an auto-
motive engineer. He had not conducted any experiments on the crucial point
of the case, the "reaction time" of a driver suddenly encountering an unusual
circumstance, a pedestrian appearing suddenly on the road and his brakes
failing. The estimate of such was, therefore, of a highly speculative nature.
The Supreme Court deemed that evidence to be inadmissible, and as well
considered that the trial judge had added weight and significance to it. "They
[the jury] would understand from what the learned trial Judge had said to them
that there is an interval of time following an emergency in which the driver-of
a motor car is as a matter of law "entitled to lose his head" in the sense that
he will not during such interval be legally responsible for what would otherwise
be negligent actions and omissions on his part.,3
The Court gave two reasons for the objection. First, the evidence was not
based on actual experiments or other scientific grounds. For the second objec-
tion the quotation from Phipson is made. "Neither experts nor ordinary wit-
nesses may give their opinions upon matters of legal or moral obligation, or
general human nature, or the manner in which other persons would probably
act or be influenced. '34
Phipson's distinction between scientific and non-scientific evidence is
correctly applied in the Supreme Court case but misconstrued in the contempt
case. Expert scientific evidence can only be introduced when it is possible to
have such information. Evidence merely purporting to be scientific is inadmis-
sible. Phipson's point concerns cases in which there is no scientific knowledge
to be had, and in which speculation would indeed be idle. The present case
does not fall in Phipson's inadmissible category because scientific information
was relevant, possible to obtain and indeed available in the courtroom.
The theory of the impressionable university student
The Court considered it particularly important to enforce the law of
scandalizing in this case because university students were the readers affected
by the contempt. The judges believed university students to be a highly
impressionable lot, more so than younger students or other citizens. Further-
more the Court believed students would likely carry through life the opinions
they acquired at university. The Court appeared to consider they had a grave
responsibility to protect such unsophisticated minds from the corrupting
influence of student newspaper articles.
32 Adam v. Campbell. [1950] 3 D.L.R. 449.
33 Id., p. 457.
34 Id., p. 458.
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The defence had expert testimony to give (which was not admitted) to
refute this theory on two grounds. The indirect evidence consists of a fairly
extensive literature on the acquisition of beliefs on the legitimacy of political
institutions, however not specifically with reference to courts. These data con-
sistently show that such fundamental attitudes are acquired early in life,
roughly in the elementary school years, and are not substantially changed,
given normal conditions, after thatY5 Most children formulate their basic
attitudes to political institutions including the courts very early in life, certainly
before entering high school. In the early years of elementary school these
opinions are highly favourable to and trusting of the authority in question.
Children lose this extreme naivet6 gradually, and indeed by the time of entry
into high school are fairly close to their teachers in the amount of trust they
show. There is not much change in attitudes to authorities other than the
courts in high school, but no studies appear to have been done directly on
court attitudes in the high school age group.
Changes in attitudes to the courts during the university years can be
studied directly with the results of the New Brunswick survey. The same eight
questions on court attitudes already discussed were re-analyzed so that the
responses of each age group, from 18 and under, to 23 or over could be
compared. The results of this analysis are reported in Appendix B. On none
of the questions were there statistically significant differences by age group,
which we would expect to find if there is systematic attitude change during
this period.
Another way to consider this question is to compare the proportion of
students in each age group giving a "don't know" response to each question.
If the judges' theory is correct the highest "don't know" response should
appear in the youngest age group, and the proportion should fall progressively
until in the oldest group the smallest proportion appears. Appendix C shows
that such was not the case. The proportions having no opinion fluctuated,
with no discernible pattern appearing on any of the questions.
The concept of probability
The statement about the manner in which other people "would probably
act or be influenced" raises a very important and more general problem about
the nature of probability statements.36 Probability in that statement, as in
numerous other legal utterances, implies rather undisciplined musing or specu-
lation, without any defined range. The term is used frequently in that sense
in everyday speech. However, its meaning in science is considerably stricter,
although admittedly there is no one accepted definition of probability. Popper's
definition of the word, a common and useful concept in social science, will be
used here. A probability statement is a statement about the likelihood of an
event taking place based on the frequency of that event having taken place in
35 Robert D. Hess & Judith V. Torney. The Development of Political Attitudes in
Children. Chicago: Aldine, 1967.
F. I. Greenstein. Children and Politics. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965.
Herbert Hyman. Political Socialization. Glencoe: Free Press, 1959.
s6 Phipson, op. cit., supra note 18, p. 385.
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the past under similar conditions.37 There is a 50 percent probability of the
next toss of the coin being heads because a long (technically infinite) series of
previous tosses showed an average of 50 per cent heads. I
A probability statement is not a fact per se, but an expression of faith
that certain processes known about (the facts) will continue to operate as they
did when they were studied and then stated to be facts. In Phipson's ranking
of facts and hypotheses based on facts probability statements would fall some-
where in between.
If an expert can give evidence on hypotheses based on facts he should
certainly be able to give probability statements in evidence. The problem lies
in the courts' failure to distinguish between the strict and loose definitions of
"probability" - discrediting the strict meaning with the loose.
Any expert witness is implicitly making probability statements when he
gives his evidence in any event. Consider for example a doctor, giving
evidence in a negligence case, who states that 80 per cent of patients with
certain symptoms and condition die within x days of surgery even with the
best care. A jury from that would infer that the patient in question, having had
the same symptoms and condition, died as a result of the disease, not to any
lack of attention or incompetence. To not allow the doctor to state that the
patient had an 80 per cent probability of early death is splitting hairs.
Calculation
The charge that initiated proceedings in the case was both that the
offending article was "calculated to" and "does in fact bring" the courts into
public ridicule and contempt. The prosecution did not have to show that the
article did in fact bring the court into ridicule, and indeed admitted that it
could not. Consequently what constitutes "calculation" is an important point.
What this word means in law is not entirely clear. We will hazard a
guess through the process of progressively eliminating alternative possible
meanings. First of all calculation does not mean intent. The Court ruled that
it was not necessary to prove intention to prove calculation.3 Next, calcula-
tion does not mean what actually happens and evidence to show that the courts
had not actually been brought into public ridicule and contempt would not
have been a defence. Further it does not mean what a reasonable man would
consider likely to bring the courts into public ridicule and contempt. (The
court held that evidence on opinions was inadmissible. In any event the
prosecution did not attempt to bring in any citizen to give evidence that the
article would likely have had that effect.)
It appears to mean what a judge considers a reasonably likely outcome of
the action - irrespective of the actor's intention or the actual result. Thus
a person who had no intention of attacking the courts' reputation, who did not
37 Karl R. Popper. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. New York: Basic Books, 1959,
p. 149.
38R . v. Murphy. (1969) 4 D.L.R. 3d 289.
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actually damage it, and who did not even make anyone else think his words
might have had that effect, could be found guilty of contempt if a judge
considered his words could have had that effect.
The major objection to such an interpretation is that it implies some
objective meaning. If the only criteria for assessing calculation are the judges'
opinions of a likely outcome then calculation simply means the judges'
opinions of a likely outcome. The word implies more than this, that the
property of calculation lies in what was written, with the judge's role being that
only of observation and evaluation.
The theory of the power elite
Mr. Justice Limerick said in court that he objected to the defendant's
sweeping criticism of the judicial system more than to his criticism of the
specific judge and judgement (which formed the first part of the column). The
criticism of the system was made in an unacademic way. It was sarcastic,
without qualification and without evidence. It was a student's unsupervised
attempt to generalize from acceptable (though controversial) sociological
theory to a particular point about the judicial system.
There is extensive evidence of the influence of the corporate elite, in
Canada as well as in other comparable countries, in politics, the arts,
education, and the social welfare system. However there is very little informa-
tion about the way the influence is made. Moreover, what evidence there is,
is indirect. It is known that judges come disproportionately from business and
upper class backgrounds, have disproportionately attended schools and univer-
sities with corporate elite members, and disproportionately belong to the same
clubs and formal associations. 39 They are accordingly likely to understand
and be sympathetic to the views of the corporate elite, and are not likely to
understand or be sympathetic to the views of radicals, artists, Indians and poor
people with whom they have little in common.
The accused took the known information and extended it in a logical
way. If the corporate elite is known to influence many important social
institutions it is likely to influence another one as well. The defence contended
that it was legitimate for a student (or anyone) to do that. Indeed it is the role
of the university to encourage students to think for themselves. The risk of
error must be taken for it is to be preferred to the certain alternative of
stagnation.
One writer of some reputation in British sociology considers it intrinsi-
cally impossible for the judicial system to be fair in any way but in a trivial
sense of the word.40 Thus all poor people might be treated equally (and
badly) but never would the rich and the poor be treated alike. As soon as
there are laws there is inequality, for the very existence of laws presupposes an
already existing inequality in power. Someone made the laws and enforces
them; by definition he is more powerful than those against whom he enforces
39 John Porter. The Vertical Mosaic. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965.
40 Ralf Dahrendorf. Essays in the Theory of Society. London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1968, pp. 151-178.
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them. Those who are punished assume, as a consequence of punishment,
a status lower than those who order the punishment and others who are not
punished. This ensures that there will always be a minimum of two classes in
every society: the punished and the non-punished.
The whole sense of Dahrendorf's theory is that the judicial system is a
means of furthering the goals of the powerful. The way that this is done will
vary considerably, so that in a modem industrial country notions of equality
before the law and due process could be well implemented. But it would be
proper to infer from Dahrendorf that the judicial system is one of the many
tools of those who have power. In a society based on a corporate economy the
courts would be to some extent the tool of the corporate elite, although of
course serving other functions as well. Dahrendorf does not in the slightest
suggest deliberate corruption; his analysis concerns institutionalized relation-
ships only.
The connection between judicial authority, political and economic can
better be seen in considerably earlier periods (for example mediaeval Eng-
land) and in other countries. The word court came from the court of the
king, as in mediaeval England the king with his court personally travelled
around the country dispensing justice. (Ecclesiastical courts did as well,
independently of the king.) The king was then the most powerful person
economically. He had to have Parliament's authorization to tax after Magna
Carta but he still owned vast lands and could regulate business through
charters and licenses. The king shared his power with lords, but these per-
sonally held the same combination of judicial, political and economic power.
Eventually a king appointed a judge in his place beginning the long trend
of division of labour. This division has become extensive in Britain and the
countries developing from it. There still are connections although the sepa-
ration of powers and the independence of the judiciary are considered to be
ideals. The fact that judicial appointments are partisan political appointments
is one sign of the continued connection.
Research has been done in the United States on the relationship between
the party of the judge and the type of decision he makes, demonstrating that
there is a significant association. It has been shown that Republican judges
acquit fewer accused on criminal charges than Democratic judges and Repub-
lican members of regulatory commissions favour big business, monopolistic
practices and procedures in disputes more than Democratic members.4'
In other words the political nature of the appointment does have an effect on
the decisions actually made. No comparable research has been done in
Canada so it is not known if a similar relationship exists here.
In view of the fact that political and judicial authority were previously
intermingled in our history the fact of a continued connection should not be
unexpected. The trend has been and continues to be in the direction of
separation, but institutions take a very long time to change.
41 Stuart S. Nagel. The Legal Process from a Behavioral Perspective. Homewood,
Illinois: Dorsey, 1969, pp. 227 & 238.
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One last point should be made on the political-economic connection. The
dominant mode of thinking in social science today is of economic determinism
of some kind. Economic and social variables are considered to be the causes;
political variables are seen as the results. Political biographies and studies of
political decision-makers stress socio-economic background. Cross-cultural
work on political development makes the economic variables the causes.42
Lenski's work on stratification makes technological and economic variables
antecedent to the political.43 Put in the context of the bulk of the writing on
the subject the idea of the corporate elite influencing the judicial system is
highly conforming social science.
Dr. Jones's evidence on what is taught in universities in sociology was cut
short with the Court's ruling that it was irrelevant to the question of contempt.
A student could discuss such theories in the classroom but outside it he was
liable to the laws of contempt. Engineers would not know that what was con-
tained in the student newspaper was a sociological theory, and might mistake it
for the truth. Moreover, the student paper is also sold outside the campus,
downtown, where anyone might buy it.
The Court did not appear to have any appreciation that ideas about the
power elite are not obscure sociological theories. (The term "sociology" had
to be defined for the Court, also "attitude change" and "corporate elite". The
Court appeared to assume that its own ignorance of these ideas was as general
on the campus.) In fact the various theories of the power elite are common
to all the social science disciplines and are subjects of popular interest. Cheap
paperback editions of numerous versions of these ideas, such as Mills's The
Power Elite,44 are available and are read by the "intelligent layman". They are
discussed in political club meetings and seminars and other non-academic
settings as well as in classes.
The necessity of the offence of scandalizing the courts
The Court believed that the offence of contempt of court by scandalizing
was a necessity to society in that the courts could not function properly with-
out such protection and consequently without it society itself would be
weakened. The Court clearly considered that the practical issue of whether
or not the offence was "needed" was one of the factors to be determined. The
judgement stated that undoubtedly there should be greater latitude allowed
now than in the past. Canada is more mature politically now so its institu-
tions need less support from the threat of punishment and can rely on inter-
nalized legitimacy more.
Once a practice is developed to protect a social institution it becomes a
question of fact as to whether that practice does support that institution,
or whether it works against the institution, or whether it has no effect either
42 Daniel Lerner. The Passing of Traditional Society. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press,
1958.
43 Gerhard Lenski. Power and Privilege. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966.
44 New York: Oxford University Press, 1959. Also: Arnold M. Rose. The Power
Structure. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967 and Richard H. Rovere. The
Amnerican Establishnent. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946.
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way. Hypotheses about the effect of certain practices can be set up and tested.
This is not an easy area to research as there are so many inter-connected
variables, but it is possible to gain some information of higher quality than
mere speculation.
The best way of finding out the effect of one practice is to see what
happens in situations, otherwise similar, that do not use the practice. For the
case of contempt of court by scandalizing it is possible to do this, albeit in a
limited way. Britain and the United States have restricted the scope
of their contempt practices. It is reasonable to hypothesize that if these
countries manage to do without, or with less protection from the scandalizing
offence, without the administration of justice or public respect for the courts
being adversely affected, then the practice is not required for the protection
of the institutions of justice. Desirably a greater range of countries would be
used in the analysis. But if it can be shown that countries similar to Canada
do not need contempt of court by scandalizing we can reasonably argue that
Canada does not either.
In the United States for a contempt of court to exist there must be
"imminent peril to the administration of justice". This is interpreted in a way
that allows an enormous amount of criticism of the courts. The fact that the
"impeach Earl Warren" campaign was permitted demonstrates how much
criticism is tolerated. Yet the courts are highly respected in the country.
Surveys on the prestige of various occupations show that Supreme Court Jus-
tices are almost always at the top of the scale in terms of the respect accorded
them by the public. This has been true even during the period of widespread
and often bitter criticism of the liberal trend of the Supreme Court. The courts
play a greater political role in the United States than in Canada, in a sense
making it even more essential for that society to have its courts respected. The
courts have been used effectively in the movement to gain greater civil rights
for many groups: Negroes, the poor, the mentally ill, and criminals, a function
that Canadian courts seldom perform.
In Britain the courts allow in practice far more criticism than in Canada,
although the offence of scandalizing has not gone out of use entirely. Lord
Denning in the judgement acquitting the Hon. Quentin Hogg, Q.C., of con-
tempt stated this clearly. "We will never use this jurisdiction [contempt] as a
means to uphold our own dignity. That must rest on surer foundations. Nor
will we use it to suppress those who speak against us. We do not fear criti-
cism, nor do we resent it. For there is something far more important at stake.
It is no less than freedom in speech itself".45 No one would seriously dispute
that the courts of Britain are held in enormous respect and that democratic
institutions are as safe there as anywhere. The scope of contempt of court by
scandalizing has been gradually reduced throughout the twentieth century yet
there has been no comparable decline in respect for the courts or judges
noticeable for the same period.
The law on sedition provides a good analogy to the law on contempt by
scandalizing. Seditious libel protected the monarch from disrespectful criti-
45 R. v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, [1968] W.L.R. 120.
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cism, among other things. It no longer includes that interpretation but requires
incitement to violence or something involving real danger rather than mere
words.46 Yet without this protection the Queen suffers no more public ridicule
and probably less than her predecessors who had it.
Lastly there is evidence from Canada itself that the offence of contempt
by scandalizing is not essential to the administration of justice. There are
numerous administrative boards that exercise a judicial function, such as the
Labour Relations Board, the Ontario Municipal Board and the Workmen's
Compensation Board, functioning without the protection of the scandalizing
offence. That they function satisfactorily is borne out by the fact that more
and more quasi-judicial boards are being created. They are not subjected to
any noticeable amount of abuse and they do deal with important issues as do
the regular courts.
The examples of court systems working effectively with less protection by
scandalizing than Canada have included a system with more functions to
perform (the United States), a country with racial strife and great political
dissension (the United States), and a system adapting itself to a different role
in the world (Britain). Canada's problems being no greater than these it is
difficult to defend the view that the offence of scandalizing is a necessity with-
out which society would suffer.
46 Crankshaw's Criminal Code, 7th edition, 1959, p. 110.
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APPENDIX A
COMPARISON OF THE SAMPLE OF U.N.B. STUDENTS
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APPENDIX B
STUDENT OPINIONS ON THE COURTS, BY AGE
question question question question
1 2 3 4
age 18 and under 39%* 27% 21% 54%
age 19 27 14 16 54
age20 32 23 13 53
age 21 26 12 19 43
age22 13 6 10 25
age 23 and over 30 16 15 35
X2 = 6.75 X2 = 2.08 X 2 = 5.75 X2 = 2.15
P>.20 P>.10 P>.30 P>.80
question question question question
5 6 7 8
age 18 and under 28% 49% 44% 27%
age 19 27 42 36 21
age 20 33 51 41 29
age2l 20 38 33 15
age22 16 12 19 6
age 23 and over 27 38 30 24
X2 = 1.35 X2 = 4.85 X2 = 1.58 X2 = 7.61
P>.90 P>.40 P>.90 P>.10
* Percent giving the first answer stated for the question.
See Table I for the questions and answers; the same order is followed
here.
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APPENDIX C
NON-RESPONSE TO COURT QUESTIONS, BY AGE
question 1 question 2 question 3 question 4
%* rank** % rank % rank % rank
age 18
& under 15.2 6 13.6 2 12.1 3 1.5 4
age 19 24.2 3 12.3 3 20.0 19 1.5 4
age 20 16.4 5 9.0 5 16.4 2 1.5 4
age 21 24.0 4 10.0 4 12.0 4 0.0 6
age 22 25.0 2 6.3 6 6.3 6 3.0 2
age 23
& over 25.9 1 16.7 1 11.1 5 9.3 1
question 5 question 6 question 7 question 8
% rank % rank % rank % rank N
age 18
& under 1.5 5
age 19 1.5 5
age 20 4.5 3
age 21 2.0 4
age 22 6.3 2
age 23







6 0.0 5 66
2 1.5 3 65
5 6.0 1 67
4 2.0 2 50
1 0.0 5 32
3 0.0 5 54
* Percent of age group giving "don't know" response.
** If the hypothesis that students acquire beliefs on the courts while at
university is correct the ranks should go from 1-6 indicating the
highest don't know response in the youngest group to the lowest in
the oldest.
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